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INTRODUCTION 
This Article has the potential to fundamentally change the way 
law firms perform internal investigations to determine whether a 
corporation has violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA” or 
“Act”). To put the economic impact of such a statement into perspective, 
in 2008 the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) reached a roughly $1.6 billion FCPA settlement 
with a German company and three of its subsidiaries.
2
 The internal 
investigation performed by the company’s law firm ultimately cost $1 
billion.
3
 And although billion-dollar FCPA investigations are unusual, 
they generally cost anywhere between $2 and $20 million.
4
 Such 
economic reality not only makes potential FCPA violations a high 
priority for companies not wanting to violate the Act, but because these 
investigations are often performed by law firms, makes such corporations 
extremely profitable clientele.
5
 
This Article will highlight a 1997 Second Circuit case—
overlooked by all FCPA scholarship—as affording U.S. law firms the 
ability to use a new attorney-client privilege that can prevent 
corporations from violating international blocking statutes during 
internal investigations.
6
 The case will further be shown to prevent the 
SEC from subpoenaing documents, brought to the U.S. by a law firm 
performing a global internal investigation, when the documents were 
undiscoverable while in a foreign country.
7
 It therefore has the potential 
to significantly impact U.S. law firms competing with foreign firms, 
sometimes outside the subpoena jurisdiction of the SEC, as well as U.S. 
mergers and acquisitions practice groups who must regularly perform 
FCPA due diligence for merger agreements.
8
 Thus, the new use of this 
scarcely cited Second Circuit case has the ability to fundamentally 
change the way internal FCPA investigations are undertaken. 
Over the years, the number of FCPA enforcement actions 
brought by the SEC has increased to a significant extent, becoming one 
of the more dangerous operational risks faced by multinational 
                                                 
2 Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, Introductory Essay: A Proposal for a United States 
Department of Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 
161 (2010). 
3 Id. at 208–209. 
4 Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and Acquisition Transactions: 
Successor Liability and its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 247, 278 (2010). 
5 Peter J. Henning, The High Price of Internal Inquiries, NEW YORK TIMES DEAL BOOKE (Aug. 10, 
2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05 /06/the-high-price-of-internal-investigations. 
6 See Section V of this article. 
7 See Sections III and IV of this article. 
8 See generally Carolyn Lindsey, More Than You Bargained For: Successor Liability Under the U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 959 (2009). 
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corporations.
9
 The impact of increased enforcement has been so 
widespread due in part to the ability of the SEC to enforce the statute 
against entirely extraterritorial activity.
10
 This effect is intensified by the 
fact that corporations worry not only about their operations throughout 
the world, but also the operations of their many subsidiaries whose 
violation of the FCPA can result in large penalties for both the subsidiary 
and its parent corporation.
11
  Greater FCPA risk due to increased SEC 
enforcement actions has accordingly led to large corporate expenditures 
in an effort to avoid multimillion-dollar fines.
12
 
In recent years, corporations have spent hundreds of millions of 
dollars hiring U.S. law firms for FCPA related matters, of which many 
were employed to perform internal investigations to determine FCPA 
compliance.
13
 During these investigations, in order to stay competitive 
with foreign law firms, it is of utmost importance to protect both 
themselves and their corporate clientele from the sometimes harmful 
legal problems that arise out of the interaction of a regulatory agency in 
the U.S., a parent corporation in a different country, and its subsidiary in 
another.
14
 If law firms ignore potential legal problems that arise during 
these global internal investigations, they could subject both themselves 
and their clients to foreign criminal and financial penalties.
15
 Moreover 
they could bring documents normally outside the SEC’s jurisdictional 
reach within the SEC’s subpoena power. If at all possible, law firms and 
corporations should work to prevent such outcomes. 
This Article analyzes major legal obstacles to global internal 
investigations that until now have been entirely overlooked by FCPA 
scholarship. A very important aspect of internal investigations is that a 
parent corporation and its law firm may violate blocking statutes over the 
course of an investigation. At this point in FCPA scholarship, no article 
has extensively detailed U.S. courts’ stance on blocking statutes and their 
potential effect on law firms and parent corporations undertaking such 
                                                 
9 Remember Four Key FCPA Facts, WORLD COMPLIANCE, http://www.fcpa-
worldcompliance.com/fcpa-key-facts.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2011) (“Ignoring the FCPA 
regulation creates danger even for foreign corporations.”). 
10 Rollo C. Baker, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 647, 649–50 (2010). 
11 See Section IV of this article. 
12 Anjali Cynthia Das, Das Article on U.K. Bribery Act on Front Page of PLUS Journal, 
WILSONELSER (Jul. 21, 2011), http://www.wilsonelser. com/NewsPubs/detail.aspx?news=415 (“To 
date, companies have spent hundreds of millions of dollars in responding to claims and 
investigations by the government, regulators, and shareholders alike with respect to purported acts of 
bribery under the FCPA.”  Much of this is spent on internal investigation. See Sections III through 
IV of this article.). 
13 See Section III of this article. 
14 Tarun, supra note 2, at 208–209. 
15 See, e.g., Denise E. Backhouse, French Blocking Statute Still Gets No Respect from U.S. Court, 
MORGAN LEWIS (Dec. 15, 2009), 
http://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publication.detail/publicationID/d5a96eff-9359-
44d8-bb64-d1db9ed6bcf4 (A party can face “potential criminal and civil penalties in France for 
noncompliance with the Blocking Statute.”). 
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investigations.
16
 Plainly, the effects of these statutes should not be 
ignored.
17
 Corporations and law firms in violation of a blocking statute 
face financial and criminal penalties in combination with bad publicity 
for being charged with ignoring foreign law.
18
 In addition to being the 
first FCPA article to offer a unique tool to prevent corporations and law 
firms from violating foreign blocking statutes, it will also be the first to 
highlight that such tool can prevent the SEC from reaching foreign 
documents sent to a U.S. law firm hired to conduct an internal 
investigation.
19
 Thus, it will analyze and offer tools to combat major 
legal obstacles to FCPA internal investigations. 
To better illustrate how blocking statutes and the SEC’s 
regulatory power combine to negatively impact entities involved with 
carrying out internal investigations, this Article presents a hypothetical. 
It will assume a parent corporation is located in Russia, its subsidiary 
that violated the FCPA is in France, and the law firm performing the 
internal investigation is based in the U.S. Under such circumstance the 
law firm’s and parent corporation’s decision to provide documents, 
obtained from a French corporation, to U.S. regulatory or legal 
proceedings will subject both the law firm and parent corporation to the 
criminal and civil penalties of France’s blocking statute.20 As is 
sometimes presented in FCPA cases, we will also assume that the French 
subsidiary is outside the reach of an SEC subpoena such that allowing a 
U.S. law firm to bring documents into the U.S. to investigate FCPA 
charges may well bring otherwise unreachable documents within the 
SEC’s subpoena power.21 Doing so places the parent corporation at an 
unnecessary tactical disadvantage in potential SEC litigation.
22
 The 
question, therefore, necessarily arises whether there is judicial precedent 
that can be employed to prevent both corporate clients from being 
                                                 
16 A 10/03/2011 search on Westlaw using the following search terms ("blocking statutes" or 
"blocking statute”) & (“foreign corrupt practices act”) returns 21 results of which no article provides 
an in-depth discussion of blocking statutes’ effect on FCPA internal investigations.   
17 For example, Siemens agreed to pay an $800 million dollar FCPA settlement in 2008. See Sarah 
E. Streicker, White Collar Defense & Compliance, Securities Enforcement & Investigations Update, 
MAYER BROWN (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article .asp?id=5951. 
18 Florian A. Stamm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Keeping All Hands On The Table, SMITH, 
GAMBRELL & RUSSELL (Spring 2006), 
http://www.sgrlaw.com/resources/trust_the_leaders/leaders_issues/ttl15/836/ (“[C]ompanies found 
to have violated the FCPA are bound to receive negative publicity.”). 
19 The case that will be used to prevent corporations from violating blocking statutes is In re Sarrio, 
S.A., 119 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 1997). A search of "FCPA & "In re Sarrio" turns up no results on 
Westlaw, LexisNexis, Google, or Bing. 
20 French Penal Code Law No. 80-538. 
21 Bryan Moser & Michael Volkov, The Sky Is Falling! Or Is It?: Responding to Corruption and 
FCPA Issues, GRANT THORNTON, Slide 6 (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.grantthornton.com/staticfiles 
/GTCom/Calendar 
%20of%20Events/Archived%20webcasts/2011%20Archived%20webcast 
%20slides/Responding%20to%20corruption%20and%20FCPA%20issues.pdf. 
22 Id. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW                          VOLUME 8 
 
93 
 
subject to the threat of penalties from blocking statutes as well as the 
SEC from obtaining documents sent to the U.S. for legal review. This 
Article offers a unique solution to such problems using an infrequently 
cited case out of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, In re Sarrio, S.A.
23
 
Part I of this Article details the history of the FCPA, while Part II 
highlights the statute’s requirements and complexity. This will allow the 
reader to understand why investigations to determine FCPA compliance 
often cost millions of dollars. Recent cases involving FCPA internal 
investigations will then be highlighted in Part III, allowing readers to 
grasp the types of cases that could be affected by new FCPA scholarship. 
Part IV establishes the various ways liability can arise and explains how 
this Article can have a significant effect on FCPA investigations, such as 
merger and acquisition practice groups performing FCPA due diligence 
for merger agreements. Part V will explain how blocking statutes 
negatively affect internal investigations, and detail U.S. courts’ stance on 
nonproduction of documents due to compliance violating a blocking 
statute. Part VI will offer a solution, unexamined by current FCPA 
scholarship, to both the effect of blocking statutes on internal 
investigations and the ability of the SEC to reach documents when 
brought to the U.S. by a law firm performing an investigation. 
Ultimately, these new tools have the potential to change the way law 
firms perform internal investigations in a variety of legal contexts. 
I. HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed in an era of 
publicized corruption.
24
 Around the time of the Watergate scandal, many 
U.S. corporations were surveyed to determine if they were bribing 
governments for business.
25
 Among the many corporations that 
responded, the surveyors discovered several were bribing foreign 
officials for contracts worth millions of dollars.
26
 Further investigation 
revealed that “over 400 U.S. businesses had made questionable payments 
to foreign officials…[and that] Lockheed [Martin] alone admitted to 
spending more than $22 million in bribes to foreign officials.”27 
After results of the investigation were made public, the U.S. 
Congress passed legislation forbidding, inter alia, corporations from 
such acts as bribing government officials, allowing the SEC and DOJ to 
                                                 
23 119 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 1997). 
24 William C. Athanas, When Doing Business Internationally Becomes a Crime: Assisting Clients in 
Understanding and Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 71 ALA. LAW. 382, 383 
(2010). 
25 Id.  
26 Baker, supra note 10, at 648. 
27 Rebecca Koch, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: It's Time to Cut Back the Grease and Add 
Some Guidance, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 379, 382 (2005).  
SPRING 2012                                   Using Second Circuit Precedent (FCPA) 
 
94 
 
impose civil or criminal penalties for violations.
28
 At first, this statute 
was rarely enforced, but in 2005 the SEC and DOJ ramped up their 
prosecution of bribery around the world.
29
 This, as one article published 
in 2010 noted, resulted in “more criminal enforcement actions in the last 
four years than in the previous 29 of the statute’s existence.”30 Indeed the 
size and amount of such enforcement efforts has been enormous.
31
 For 
example, on December 2008, the DOJ and the SEC reached a roughly 
$1.6 billion FCPA settlement with a German company and three of its 
subsidiaries.
32
 
II. REQUIREMENTS AND COMPLEXITY OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 
The FCPA includes two major requirements. One forbids 
corporations from bribing a foreign governmental official and the other 
requires corporations to follow certain accounting principles.
33
 The 
statute imposes these requirements on many corporations, including all 
the corporations listed on a U.S. securities exchange.
34
 Unfortunately, it 
is often difficult to determine if a corporation has actually violated the 
FCPA.
35
 Because the bribery provision in particular complicates this 
determination, it will be examined to better understand why companies 
pay exorbitant amounts of money to ferret out potential violations.
36
 
The anti-bribery provision “expansively prohibit[s] U.S. 
corporations and nationals [and companies listed on a U.S. exchange] 
from paying or giving, or offering or promising to pay or give directly or 
indirectly, money or any other thing of value to any foreign government 
official, foreign political party or candidate for foreign political office for 
the purpose of obtaining or retaining business or some other unfair 
advantage.”37 The statute defines a foreign official as “any officer or 
employee of a foreign government or department, agency, or 
                                                 
28 Donald O. Mayer, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS, 
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/For-Gol/Fo reign-Corrupt-Practices-Act-
FCPA.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2011) (passed as to corporate bribery); Henry Chen, SEC, DOJ 
Continue to Enforce FCPA Cases Involving China and Joint Ventures, MCDERMOTT WILL & 
EMERY (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/public 
cations.nldetail/object_id/f35f3ffe-9d48-48c7-9fbc-05078514b126.cfm (SEC & DOJ have power to 
enforce). 
29 Athanas, supra note 24, at 383. 
30 Id. 
31 Tarun, supra note 2, at 161. 
32 Id. 
33 Baker, supra note 10, at 648. 
34 Id. 
35 “[I]n its current form, the FCPA contains many ambiguities making compliance difficult.” 
Agnieszka Klich, Bribery in Economies in Transition: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. 
J. INT'L L. 121, 167 (1996). 
36 Tarun, supra note 2, at 159–161. 
37 Id. 
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instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any 
person in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or 
department.”38 
Put simply, the provision forbids companies listed on a U.S. 
exchange from bribing government officials for business,
39
 and its 
application is expansive. The statute does not require a violation to have 
a nexus with the United States but instead is enforceable for entirely 
extraterritorial activity.
40
 As one scholar noted, the FCPA “governs 
prohibited conduct of individuals and corporations while acting entirely 
outside U.S. territory.”41 Indeed, “recent FCPA enforcement actions 
demonstrate the willingness to prosecute U.S. companies and executives 
for business activity occurring entirely abroad despite U.S. based 
personnel’s lack of knowledge and participation.”42  
Making matters more complex, the type of officials to which the 
FCPA disallows payments has been broadened to include “not only 
government officials and agents, but also employees of state-owned and 
state-controlled entities.”43 Thus, determining who is and is not a 
government official creates problems for corporations with subsidiaries 
in countries such as China.
44
 This is just one reason why it is challenging 
for U.S. companies to know whether their subsidiaries are violating the 
FCPA, as a parent can be liable for any bribes given to a hard-to-define 
class of government officials.
45
 
Much like other provisions of the FCPA, of the statute’s two 
affirmative defenses, the first is also difficult to interpret.  This is 
because it contains ambiguities that make it difficult for corporations to 
know whether they fall within the purview of the defense.
46
 The first 
defense provides that an “offer or promise of anything of value [that] is 
lawful under the laws and regulations of the foreign official’s country” 
will not be a violation of the FCPA.
47
 The second defense allows a 
company to escape prosecution under the FCPA if an offer or promise of 
value was a “reasonable and bona fide expenditure . . . directly related to 
(A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services; 
or (B) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign 
                                                 
38 Baker, supra note 10, at 649–50. 
39 Tarun, supra note 2, at 159–161. 
40 Baker, supra note 10, at 649–50. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 660. 
44 Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private Right of Action, 
82 CALIF. L. REV. 185, 201 (1994). 
45 Matthew J. Kovacich, Backyard Business Going Global: The Consequences of Increased 
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") on Minnesota and Wisconsin, 32 
HAMLINE L. REV. 529, 536 n.39 (2009). 
46  Lauren Giudice, Regulating Corruption: Analyzing Uncertainty in Current Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Enforcement, 91 B.U.L. REV. 347 (2011). 
47 Id. at 357. 
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government or agency thereof."
48
 The difficulty with the first defense is 
that it challenges corporations to interpret the local laws of the countries 
wherein they operate, making it sometimes unclear whether an action 
actually violates the FCPA.
49
 As one scholar highlighted, “in its current 
form, the FCPA contains many ambiguities making compliance 
difficult.”50 Indeed, it is not only difficult to determine if an action 
violates the FCPA, but it is also economically burdensome to do so. Due 
to such difficulty the cost of internal investigations and government 
sanctions can be unexpectedly high.  
III. RECENT CASES INVOLVING FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
INVESTIGATIONS 
The trend for a number of years has been for corporations to bear 
the financial and organizational burdens of conducting internal 
investigations, and the costs can be enormous.
51
 As one scholar noted, “ . 
. . FCPA regulation resulting from ramped-up, public enforcement ‘has 
enabled the government to put pressure on companies to self-evaluate 
and to spend company resources in gathering evidence overseas and 
turning that information over to the government.’”52 As a result, “the 
number of internal investigations, compliance enhancements, 
disciplinary actions, and remedial steps voluntarily taken by the private 
sector dwarfs the number of FCPA enforcement actions.”53 This is partly 
due to the incentive to independently perform internal investigations, 
because, “voluntarily disclosing violations to the government can often 
avoid prosecution as well as the reputational damage likely to be 
incurred in litigating an FCPA case.”54 This regulatory reality, however, 
is made financially difficult in light of the high cost associated with 
conducting an internal investigation.
55
 For example, the total cost of the 
German corporation Siemens’s internal investigation ultimately reached 
                                                 
48 Id. 
49 Kovacich, supra note 46, at n.39. 
50 Klich, supra note 35, at 147. 
51 Grimm, supra note 4, at 278-80. 
52 Id.(quoting Colleen Mahoney, Head of Sec. Enforcement & Compliance at Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom LLP, Remarks at the PricewaterhouseCoopers Roundtable Discussion: Navigating 
Dangerous Waters: FCPA: Managing International Business and Acquisition Compliance Risk 
(2008), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/acquisition-
compliance-risk.jhtml (click on download button to access the PDF document)). 
53 Homer Moyer, DOJ Turns up Heat on Foreign Corrupt Practices, INFLUENCE (July 2005), 
http://www.millerchevalier.com/portalresource/ 
lookup/poid/Z1tOl9NPl0LTYnMQZ56TfzcRVPMQiLsSwSZCu0!/document.name=/DOJ%20Turns
%20Up%20Heat%20on%20Foreign%20Corrupt%20Practices%20%5BInfluence%206-
05%20Moyer%5D.pdf. 
54 Grimm, supra note 4, at 278. 
55 Tarun, supra note 2, at 208-09. 
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$1 billion dollars.
56
 Although this is an unusually high example of the 
costs associated with an internal investigation, generally such 
investigations cost companies anywhere between $2 and $20 million.
57
 
To put the gravity of internal investigations and the importance for law 
firms to attract these lucrative clients in perspective, below are two 
examples of the types of cases that arise out of the regulatory reality of 
the FCPA: 
 
A. Avon 
 
Avon began investigating its Chinese operations “over an 
allegation of improper expenses for items like travel and entertainment 
on behalf of a Chinese government official.”58 Almost a year later, the 
corporation widened its investigation to include review of potential 
FCPA violations in other countries.
59
 The company is currently 
cooperating with the DOJ and SEC with regard to its international 
internal investigation, which will ultimately be enormous.
60
 As one 
attorney noted, “it will be expensive, not only in relation to fines, but the 
cost of the investigation.”61 One of the available reports indicates Avon 
has paid roughly $35 million in investigative costs since 2009. And the 
company anticipates paying $95 million for the total internal 
investigation. Its first quarter earnings dropped $74.8 million, and it has 
lost roughly $10 million worth of profits from its Chinese operations.
62
 
 
B. Team Inc. 
 
The internal investigation of the company Team Inc. is an 
example of the massive internal investigation costs that can arise out of 
even small bribes.
63
 The Texas based company began investigating what 
it believed to be $50,000 worth of bribes.
64
 It had estimated that they 
occurred over a five-year period, paying Trinidadian officials roughly 
$10,000 a year for business deals.
65
 Indeed the business the bribes 
                                                 
56 Id. 
57 Grimm, supra note 4, at 278 (citing Susan F. Friedman, Mission Possible: Developing in-House 
Counsel’s Role in the Fight against Global Corruption, 239 N.Y. L. J. 23 (2008)). 
58 Jessica Wohl & Donny Kwok, UPDATE 2-Avon suspends four execs in China bribery probe, 
REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/ article/2010/04/13/avon-china-
idUSN1318680420100413. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Thomas Fox, Top Ten FCPA Investigations of 2010, TOMFOX LAW (Jan. 08, 2011), 
https://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/10663-Top-Ten-FCPA-Investigations-of-2010.html. 
63 Grimm, supra note 4, at 278. 
64 Richard L Cassin, Measuring Compliance, FCPA BLOG (August 6, 2009), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/8/7/measuring-compliance.html. 
65 Id. 
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created apparently amounted to “just one-half of one percent of Team’s 
global revenues.”66 Nevertheless, the costs associated with the firm’s 
internal investigation have been massive, amounting to an estimated $3.2 
million dollars of investigatory costs.
67
 
Ultimately, the examples of Avon and Team Inc. show what 
makes FCPA cases so relevant to corporations and law firms: the fines 
and internal investigations involve enormous sums of money. With this 
understanding, it is important to highlight what sort of corporate 
activities instigate such massively expensive, and for law firms, lucrative 
investigations. This is not only relevant for the purposes of 
understanding the FCPA’s regulatory nature, but also to fully realize the 
value associated with one’s ability to prevent blocking statutes from 
harming corporations’ and law firms’ bottom line. 
IV. PARENT SUBSIDIARY RELATIONSHIP AS WELL AS MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS SPUR INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 
Internal investigations are instituted for a variety of reasons. One 
of the most common catalysts “typically result[s] from discovery—by 
the Company, the media, an external auditor, or a whistleblower—of 
circumstances that raise a serious concern of potential liability or 
financial misconduct.”68 Although the SEC can spend resources to 
perform internal investigations, the burden is generally borne by a 
suspected corporation.
69
  
Global internal investigations also arise due to a subsidiary’s 
violation of the FCPA.
70
 Because the FCPA allows for the imposition of 
penalties against a parent corporation for its subsidiary’s violations, 
investigations into a subsidiary are sometimes instigated and then 
managed by a parent corporation.
71
 This is due to the ease with which 
liability can be imposed on a parent.
72
  
The FCPA requires parent corporations who own a fifty percent 
or less interest in a subsidiary to “proceed in good faith to use its 
                                                 
66 Id. 
67 Mike Koehler, Archive for the ‘Team Inc.’, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 11, 2011), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/category/team-inc. 
68 David Brodsky, Recommended Practices for Companies and Their Counsel in Conducting 
Internal Investigations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74 (2009). 
69 Grimm, supra note 4, at 278-80. 
70 Danforth Newcomb, Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, SHEARMAN & STERLING, 
at 3 (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www. shearman.com/ files/upload/FCPA_Trends.pdf (“In the cases of 
Vetco and ABB, the prosecution was of both foreign and domestic subsidiaries of a foreign parent 
corporation.”). 
71 H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 
BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 20 (1998); Mike Koehler, Johnson & Johnson Enforcement Action Focuses on 
Health Care Providers As "Foreign Officials", FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 10, 2011), 
http://fcpaprofessor. blogspot.com/2011/04/johnson-johnson-enforcement-action.html. 
72 Id. 
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influence” to force the subsidiary into compliance with the FCPA.73 Even 
if a corporation proceeds in good faith to prevent a violation, the 
corporate veil between the parent and subsidiary can nevertheless be 
pierced, allowing liability to be imposed on the parent corporation.
74
 As 
one scholar noted, “[The] corporate veil may be pierced, resulting in 
criminal and civil liability being imputed to the parent, where the parent 
so dominated the affairs of the subsidiary that the subsidiary is found to 
be the mere ‘alter ego’ of the parent.”75 Again, such legal relationship 
makes it likely a parent corporation will institute an internal investigation 
into its subsidiary, particularly because some are “organized under the 
laws of another country, the subsidiary itself [being] exempt from the 
requirements and prohibitions of the FCPA [and] [a]s a result, the U.S. 
parent may face liability under the FCPA for the acts of a subsidiary, 
which is itself immune from prosecution.”76  
Expensive investigations also frequently occur during the due 
diligence phase of large financial transactions such as mergers and 
acquisitions.
77
 In fact “[i]n 2009, ‘more than one-third of the corporate 
FCPA enforcement actions … implicated successor liability issues 
arising from M & A deals.”78 The importance of such due diligence 
cannot be overstated. For example, where a company represented that it 
was compliant with the FCPA in one of the clauses of its merger 
agreement, the SEC used this to force the company into a roughly $15 
million dollar settlement when it was discovered such representation was 
false.
79
 In light of the fact that discovering FCPA violations after a 
merger can “erase any value the deal added to the company's books,” it 
has become extremely important for companies to perform internal 
investigations.
80
  
In the merger and acquisition context, it would be a particularly 
useful tool for corporations to prevent the SEC from obtaining 
documents brought to the US for legal review. During the FCPA due 
diligence phase of a merger, a corporation may obtain documents from a 
subsidiary over which the parent lacks control.
81
 Because the parent does 
                                                 
73 Id. at 21. 
74 Mathew Queler, Proskauer on International Litigation and Arbitration: Managing, Resolving, and 
Avoiding Cross-Border Business or Regulatory Disputes, PROSKAUER (Aug. 10, 2011), 
http://www.proskauerguide. com/law_topics/27/I. 
75 Brown, supra note 71, at 21. 
76 Id. at 2. 
77 Grimm, supra note 4, at 253. 
78 Id. (quoting F. Joseph Warin et al., Nine Lessons of 2009: The Year-in-Review of Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Enforcement, 38 SEC. REG. L.J. 19, 41 (2010)). 
79 Id. at 250-251. 
80 Lindsey, supra note 8, at 960. 
81 There are no reported cases involving a government agency issuing a subpoena against a parent 
corporation seeking documents held by its subsidiary. There are, however, many cases analyzing the 
issue in the context of private civil litigation. These courts look to rule 34(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (FRCP) to determine whether production should be required.  The analysis of these 
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not control the subsidiary, the SEC generally cannot subpoena the parent 
for documents held by its subsidiary. Therefore, bringing documents into 
the U.S. for legal review sometimes makes undiscoverable information 
discoverable.
82
 Under such circumstances, the added cost of bringing 
documents within the SEC’s reach creates the possibility of multimillion-
dollar sanctions and the violation of foreign blocking statutes. These 
economic drawbacks become transactional costs associated with a 
potential deal, reducing the expected bottom line for both companies 
such that the deal may become unprofitable. As a result, it is extremely 
important to find a solution that would prevent the SEC from reaching 
documents sent to the U.S. for legal review and would prevent blocking 
statutes from putting U.S. law firms and their clients at risk. However, 
before a solution can be presented as credible, it must be determined 
whether U.S. courts view blocking statutes as a legitimate excuse for not 
complying with an SEC subpoena. 
V. BLOCKING STATUTES: FRANCE AS A TEST CASE 
A number of nations have enacted blocking statutes, including 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and France. Many such statutes 
are violated when documents involved in an internal investigation are 
given to the SEC.
83
 These statutes essentially “prevent evidence 
                                                                                                             
cases is fully applicable to an SEC subpoena, as the FRCP governs proceedings “to compel the 
production of documents through a subpoena issued by [an]…agency” Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(5). The 
ability to subpoena documents under the FRCP usually turns upon whether the parent has control 
over requested documents, which is defined as the “legal right, authority or ability to obtain upon 
demand documents in the possession of another.” Florentia Contracting Corp. v. Resolution Trust 
Corp., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5275, at 8-9 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Camden Iron & Metal, Inc. v. 
Marubeni America Corp., 138 F.R.D. 438, 441 (D.N.J. 1991) (same); M.L.C., Inc. v. North Am. 
Philips Corp., 109 F.R.D. 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (same); United States v. International Union of 
Petroleum & Indus. Workers, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989) (same). When a dispute arises as 
to whether a party has control, the party seeking production bears the burden of proof.  See Camden 
Iron & Metal, Inc, 138 F.R.D., at 441. Although there is no specific test for determining control, the 
outcome of a court’s analysis depends on the presented factual scenario, generally turning upon: the 
percentage ownership interest in a subsidiary; whether the parent and subsidiaries corporate forms 
have been ignored; and the degree of operational integration between the parent and subsidiary.  See 
In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1152 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (parent company did 
not have sufficient control over documents held by its 43.8% owned subsidiary with which it shared 
a minority percentage of corporate directors); Gerling International Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 
839 F.2d 131, 140-142 (3d Cir. 1988) (same); Florentia Contracting Corp., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5275 at 8-9 (no control because corporate forms had not been disregarded); Camden Iron & Metal, 
138 F.R.D., at 44 (control found where corporation had power to “either indirectly [or] through 
another corporation or series of corporations elect a majority of the directors...”); M.L.C., Inc., 109 
F.R.D., at 136 (same); Caperton, 420 F. Supp., at 451 (when the need arises in the ordinary course of 
business, there is sufficient control when the need arises because of a governmental investigation); 
Florentia Contracting Corp., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5275, at 8-9 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (same); SEC v. 
Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 194 F.R.D. 469, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same); First National City Bank v. 
Internal Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616, 618 (2d Cir. 1959) (same).   
82 First National City Bank v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616, 618 (2d Cir. 1959).  
83 Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities Regulation, 34 
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 883, 910-911 (2009) (“The SEC has been particularly concerned about insider 
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gathering under U.S. law in foreign jurisdictions. A blocking statute 
forbids the communication of information [to U.S. courts and regulatory 
proceedings] except as provided by treaty or international agreement.”84 
As one scholar aptly explained, “Blocking statutes take many forms, but 
in general they operate to prohibit a resident of country A from producing 
evidence within that country to a court or enforcement agency in country 
B in response to some form of compulsory process issued by country 
B.”85 Thus, when a foreign corporation falling under the jurisdiction of a 
blocking statute receives a subpoena from the SEC, it must decide 
whether to violate the demands of the U.S. subpoena or the blocking 
statute.
86
 For corporations in such a legal dilemma, the consequences of 
violating a blocking statute can be enormous.
87
 By way of example, 
Canada’s blocking statute can impose a “$10,000 fine and/or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years,”88 while France’s 
blocking statute can levy a “€18,000 [fine] or six months 
imprisonment.”89 Unfortunately, many countries where internal 
investigations may arise have similar blocking statutes that are violated 
over the course of an investigation.
90
  
Thus, the question of whether a court will allow an entity to 
refuse to comply with an SEC subpoena when compliance would violate 
a foreign blocking statute must be answered before determining whether 
a tool to prevent law firms and parent corporations from violating them is 
valuable. Among the many blocking statutes that exist, it is likely that 
France’s statute is the broadest.91 Therefore, the analysis and conclusion 
reached under this statute would apply equally to other blocking statutes 
around the world. 
A. History and Provisions of France’s Blocking Statute 
                                                                                                             
trading, market manipulation, and financial fraud where information and evidence relating to 
suspicious conduct is located beyond the agency’s jurisdictional reach. Many foreign countries have 
secrecy or blocking statutes that prohibit the disclosure of information.”). 
84Id. at 911.  
85 James R. Atwood, Information From Abroad: Who Bears the Burden in an Antitrust 
Investigation?, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 227, 228 n.2 (1996). 
86 Karmel, supra note 83, at 911-912. 
87 Mark A. Warner, Decisions of Foreign Courts, 88 A.J.I.L. 532, 533 (1994). 
88 Id. 
89 French Penal Code Law No. 80-538. 
90 “[N]o less than 15 countries adopted so-called blocking statutes restricting the release of 
documents pursuant to an order from a court or agency in another country and forbidding 
compliance with American judicial discovery orders.” Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing 
Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 
28 CONN. L. REV. 295, 338 (1996). 
91 Ralph C. Ferrara & J. Triplett Mackintosh, Legal Representatives in the International Securities 
Market: Representing a Party or Witness in an SEC or SRO Proceeding, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 893, 
912 (1989). 
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France’s blocking statute was passed in 1980 and prohibits 
French corporations and their representatives from providing information 
about such corporations in foreign administrative or judicial 
proceedings.
92
 As previously noted, if the statute is violated, French 
authorities can pursue a fine of €18,000 and six months imprisonment.93 
To legally obtain documents falling under the restrictions of the statute, 
American litigants must use the discovery rules set forth in the Hague 
Convention.
94
 As a result, the statute criminalizes production of 
documents pursuant to a U.S. criminal, civil, or administrative 
subpoena.
95
  
Although French authorities have enforced the statute only once 
since its passage,
96
 the potential for fines and imprisonment is nevertheless 
present and hangs ominously over law firms investigating French 
corporations.
97
 Indeed, recent corporate agreements for internal 
investigations performed by the SEC and DOJ have taken the effects of 
France’s blocking statute into account, implementing measures attempting 
to avoid its violation.
98
 The question therefore remains: whether courts will 
allow parties performing internal investigations to not produce documents 
requested by the SEC because production violates foreign law. 
B. Blocking Statutes in U.S. Courts 
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. 
Court for S. Dist., 482 U.S. 522, 543-544 (U.S. 1987), provides the 
judicial framework to determine whether a litigant can ignore a U.S. 
discovery request because compliance violates foreign law. The Court 
was asked to determine when litigants can ignore a U.S. subpoena under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) and instead produce in a 
way that does not violate a blocking statute.
99
 It highlighted five guiding 
principles that the Court asserted should be used when deciding such a 
question:  
(1) the importance of the documents to the litigation,  
(2) the specificity of the discovery request,  
                                                 
92 See French Penal Code Law No. 80-538. 
93 Id. 
94 The Hague Convention, U.S.-Fr., Nov. 15, 1965, 29 U.S.T. 5159; see Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, 
S.A., 249 F.R.D. 429, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
95 See French Penal Code Law No. 80-538. 
96 See Strauss, 249 F.R.D. at 444; In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30598, at 59-60 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
97 Lucinda Low, International Law Advisory, STEPTOE & JOHNSON (Aug. 12, 2011), 
http://www.steptoe.com/newsletters-124.html. 
98 Id. 
99 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist., 482 U.S. 522, 543-544 
(1987). 
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(3) whether the information originated in the United States,  
(4) the availability of alternative means of securing the 
information, and 
(5) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would 
undermine important interests of the United States or of the 
state where the information is located.
100
  
The Court further noted that these factors cannot “require resort to 
[another method of discovery such as the] Hague Convention without 
prior scrutiny in each case of the particular facts, sovereign interests, and 
likelihood that resort to those procedures will prove effective.”101 
However, because the Court remanded the case and did not highlight a 
specific mode of analysis for lower courts to employ, the circuits have 
adopted two slightly different tests to determine whether noncompliance 
with a subpoena is proper: the Five-Factor Test and the Three-Prong 
Test.  
1. The Five-Factor Test 
 Some courts use the five factors listed in an Aerospatiale 
footnote to determine whether a blocking statute is a valid reason for not 
producing documents pursuant to a FRCP subpoena.
102
 Although there 
are no cases applying these five factors to an SEC subpoena for 
documents restricted by France’s blocking statute, the outcome of the 
test applied to the hypothetical, presented earlier, would favor 
production. 
The first factor—the importance of the documents to the 
litigation—would likely favor production of at least some of a law firm’s 
and corporation’s investigation documents so long as the subpoena is 
tailored towards discovering relevant information.
103
  
The second factor—the specificity of the discovery request—is 
difficult to evaluate until a subpoena is received from the SEC.  
However, to the extent the subpoena requests relevant documents, this 
factor also favors production.
104
 
                                                 
100 Id. at 544 n.28.   
101 Id. at 544. 
102 See, e.g., Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance Pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Global Power Equip. Group Inc., 418 B.R. 833, 847-
849 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 249 F.R.D., at 439. 
103 Cf. In re Global Power Equip. Group Inc., 418 B.R., at 847; Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis 
Jr. Ind. Com. De Equip. Medico, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1352, at 14 (S.D. Cal. 2008); Strauss v. 
Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 249 F.R.D., at 440. 
104 See Weiss v. Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC, 242 F.R.D. 33, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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The third factor—whether the information originated in the 
United States—would weigh in favor of nonproduction because 
documents falling under the blocking statute emanated from France.
105
  
The fourth factor—the availability of alternative means of 
securing the information—would favor production. Courts evaluating 
this factor have typically favored the lower cost and efficiency in 
producing documents under the FRCP as opposed to alternative 
international discovery methods such as the Hague Convention.
106
 Under 
the present hypothetical, however, the SEC has two channels to obtain a 
corporation’s documents in a way that does not violate France’s blocking 
statute: The Hague Convention and a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between the SEC and The Commission des Operations de Bourse 
of France (COB).
107
  
Courts almost always hold that obtaining documents under The 
Hague Convention is less efficient and more costly than discovery under 
the FRCP.
108
 Consequently, courts almost always conclude that this 
factor favors production.
109
 The procedure for obtaining documents 
through an MOU would also probably be more time-consuming and 
expensive than the FRCP.
110
 At least one scholar has described the 
process as “painfully slow and makes it difficult for the SEC or other 
securities commissions.”111 The SEC must send a request for documents 
to the COB who must then approve the submission before the documents 
can legally be obtained, a bureaucratic step the FRCP would circumvent. 
As a result, this factor would probably also favor production of a 
corporation’s documents pursuant to an SEC subpoena. 
The fifth factor—the extent to which noncompliance with the 
request would undermine important interests of the United States or of 
the state where the information is located—favors production of 
investigation documents pursuant to an SEC subpoena. When applying 
this factor, courts consider the United States’ interest in requiring 
production under the FRCP against France’s interest in requiring 
                                                 
105 Cf. Seoul Semiconductor Co. v. Nichia Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 832, 836 (E.D. Tex. 2008) 
(subpoenaing documents not originating from the United States whose production burdens foreign 
producer weighs against production).   
106 See, e.g., In re Aspartame Antitrust Litigation, 2008 WL 2275531, 4 (E.D. Pa. 2009); In re 
Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 2001 WL 1049433, 4 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
107 Understanding and Administrative Agreement, U.S.-Fr., Dec. 14, 1989, 13 UST 1803. 
108 See In re Aspartame Antitrust Litigation, 2008 WL 2275531, at 4 (Hague Convention time 
consuming and less certain than FRCP); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 2001 WL 1049433, at 4-5 
(same); Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 482 U.S., at 542 (Hague Convention frequently 
unduly time consuming, expensive, and less certain to produce needed evidence than FRCP). 
109 See, e.g., In re Global Power Equip. Group Inc., 418 B.R., at 847; In re Aspartame Antitrust 
Litigation, 2008 WL 2275531, at *4; In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 2001 WL 1049433, at *4; 
Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 249 F.R.D., at 439; Weiss v. Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC, 242 
F.R.D., at 45. 
110 Blumberg, supra note 90, at 338. 
111 Id. 
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production to occur through a method that does not violate its blocking 
statute.
112
 With respect to the United States’ interest, courts have 
repeatedly held that the U.S. has an interest in enforcing its securities 
laws, and that when the United States is “itself part of the litigation, the 
national interest” to compel production under the FRCP is great.113 
Courts have also held that the U.S. can only achieve its interests by 
“fully and fairly adjudicating matters before its courts,” a goal courts 
hold the FRCP helps accomplish.
114
 Thus, a court would probably rule 
that the SEC has an important interest in obtaining discovery through the 
FRCP. A court would then weigh these interests against France’s interest 
to require production under a method that does not violate its blocking 
statute. 
It is also very likely a U.S. court would give little weight to 
France’s interest in having production not violate its blocking statute. A 
majority of courts have concluded, after analyzing the statute’s 
legislative history, that its purpose was to create a bargaining chip for 
French corporations to use in foreign discovery proceedings.
115
 Courts 
have almost always found that this interest is “dwarfed by [more 
legitimate] American interests.”116 Therefore, courts would not find 
France has an interest in preventing production so its blocking statute is 
not violated. 
Under the Five-Factor Test, although some of the factors would 
favor non-production, many courts have noted that the fifth factor is 
viewed as the most important.
117
  And under the present hypothetical, the 
most important factor favors production of a corporation’s documents.118 
Moreover all but one court applying Aerospatiale’s reasoning to 
documents located in France have held that the documents should be 
produced under the FRCP notwithstanding France’s blocking statute.119 
                                                 
112 Strauss 249 F.R.D. at 443. 
113 Reinsurance Co. of America, Inc. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1281 (7th 
Cir. 1990); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 
117 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). 
114 See In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation, 2010 WL 1189341, at *4; In re Global 
Power Equip. Group Inc., 418 B.R. at 849; Strauss, 249 F.R.D. at 443. 
115 See United States v. Gonzalez, 748 F.2d 74, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Air Cargo Shipping 
Services Antitrust Litigation, 2010 WL 1189341, at *3; In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities 
Litigation, 2006 WL 3378115, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance Pour le 
Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips, 105 F.R.D. at 31. 
116 In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation, 2010 WL 1189341, at *3. 
117 Id. at *4 (fifth factor most important among the five); Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279, 286 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); Strauss, 249 F.R.D. at 444 (same). 
118 See In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation, 2010 WL 1189341, at *4 (fifth most 
important under the five factor test); Strauss, 249 F.R.D. at 444 (same); Madanes v. Madanes, 186 
F.R.D. at 286 (same). 
119 In In re Perrier Bottled Water Litigation, the court held that France’s joining of the Hague 
Convention is “an expression of France’s interests and weighs heavily in favor of the use of those 
procedures.” 138 F.R.D. 348, 354 (D. Conn. 1991). The decision is the only reported case to hold 
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Therefore, under the Five-Factor Test a court would almost certainly 
conclude that documents should be produced under the FRCP pursuant to 
an SEC subpoena.
120
  
2. The Three-Prong Test 
Other courts have employed a three-prong test derived from 
Societe Nationale, involving analysis of (1) a case’s facts, (2) the 
sovereign interests of the involved countries, and (3) the likelihood that 
resort to alternative means of production will prove effective.
121
 Due to 
the substantial similarity between the Five-Factor and Three-Prong tests, 
the outcome would probably be the same under either. Indeed, almost 
every federal court to employ the Three-Prong Test has determined that 
discovery should proceed under the FRCP rather than an alternative 
means.
122
 It is therefore almost certain that if a parent corporation or U.S. 
law firm performing an internal investigation attempted to resist a 
subpoena from the SEC for documents falling under France’s blocking 
statute, a court would force compliance. 
Not only would a court resist allowing a party to not comply 
with a subpoena due to compliance violating France’s blocking statute, 
but this conclusion is also almost certainly applicable to other blocking 
statutes around the world. Although the interests may have slight 
variations depending on the penalties and consequences associated with a 
blocking statute’s violation, the strong and often dispositive U.S. interest 
in requiring discovery to take place under the FRCP will almost always 
prevent a party from using such statutes as an excuse for non-production 
of documents. Because violating blocking statutes in the process of 
performing an internal investigation should be avoided, if at all possible, 
finding a way to prevent such violations and still comply with U.S. law is 
of prime importance for both law firms and their corporate clients. 
VI. IN RE SARRIO, A TOOL FOR PARENT CORPORATIONS AND LAW 
FIRMS 
                                                                                                             
that France joining the Hague Convention is an indication of its sovereign interest not to be subject 
to foreign discovery outside the conditions allowed under Hague. Id. 
120 See, e.g., In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2004). 
121 See In re Auto. Refinishing, 358 F.3d at 300; Valois of America, Inc. v. Risd, 183 F.R.D. 344, 346 
(D. Conn. 1997); Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386, (D.N.J. 1987). 
122 See In re Auto. Refinishing, 358 F.3d at 305 (ruling discovery should proceed under FRCP); 
Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000) (same); Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm 
Corp., 118 F.R.D. at 391 (same) In re Aircrash Disaster near Roselawn, 172 F.R.D. 295, 311 (N.D. 
Ill. 1997) (same); Doster v. Schenk, 141 F.R.D. 50, 55 (M.D.N.C. 1991) (same); MeadWestvaco 
Corp. v. Rexam PLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139843, at *6-7 (E.D. Va. 2010) (ruling in favor of 
foreign discovery procedure); Madden v. Wyeth, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8802, at *7-8 (N.D. Tex. 
2006) (same); In re Perrier, 138 F.R.D. at 356 (same). 
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Ultimately, the tool to prevent the SEC from forcing both a 
company to violate a foreign blocking statute and a law firm to turn over 
documents brought to the U.S. for legal review lies in an infrequently 
cited case out of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals: In re Sarrio, S.A., 
119 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 1997).
123
   
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals is one of the few circuits to 
face the perplexing result of requiring U.S. law firms to produce 
documents undiscoverable in the hands of their foreign client.
124
 In In re 
Sarrio, the Court supplied law firms with exciting dictum that strongly 
suggests it would not require U.S. law firms to produce documents held 
for legal review if they came from a foreign corporation outside the 
jurisdictional purview of a U.S. discovery subpoena.
125
 Interestingly 
there is little legal precedent in favor of such a proposition outside In re 
Sarrio.
126
 Accordingly, if the dictum of the case is tested and the result 
favorable to U.S. law firms, states falling under the judicial purview of 
the Second Circuit would become an extremely attractive place for law 
firms to perform corporate clients’ internal investigations. 
If the Second Circuit is directly faced with the question of 
whether a U.S. law firm must comply with a discovery request aimed at 
obtaining documents undiscoverable in the hands of the firm’s client, it 
will almost certainly rule in favor of quashing the subpoena. Although 
sending documents to an attorney for legal review, without more, does 
not furnish a basis for resisting a subpoena,
127
 as stated by In re Sarrio, 
S.A., “The Supreme Court’s discussion in Fisher v. United States, 425 
U.S. 391 (1976), seems to provide principled authority, although in dicta, 
                                                 
123 The SEC has broad power to investigate and issue subpoenas against security issuers and to 
subpoena other entities in the United States that have knowledge relating to its investigations. 
Negative consequences can arise out of such power when a foreign corporation hires a U.S. law firm 
to perform an internal investigation into its foreign subsidiary. When the law firm manages the 
internal investigation of the foreign subsidiary, both the firm and the corporation managing storage 
and operational aspects of document review for the law firm are at risk of being forced to comply 
with a discovery request from the SEC. Where documents are undiscoverable outside the U.S. and 
sent to a U.S. law firm for review (for example, if held by the subsidiary or a related corporation 
outside the jurisdictional purview of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-(a)(2)(B)), the SEC may choose to issue a 
subpoena against the investigating law firm or parent corporation rather than the subsidiary. In the 
event the law firm is judicially forced to comply with the subpoena, such a result can severely 
damage the firm’s reputation, damage the firm’s ability to attract foreign clients, and allow 
government agencies to reach documents that otherwise may have been undiscoverable. 
Furthermore, if the documents emanated from a country with a blocking statute, such as France, 
judicially required discovery compliance can result in U.S. law firms and corporations violating 
blocking statutes. This outcome is clearly unacceptable for law firms looking to attract or currently 
working with foreign corporations investigating allegations that subsidiaries have violated the 
FCPA. In re Sarrio can be employed to prevent these results. 
124 In re Sarrio, S.A., 119 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 1997). 
125 Id. 
126 Using Westlaw to Keycite In re Sarrio, S.A. provides only Kestrel Coal Pty. Ltd. v. Joy Global, 
Inc., 362 F.3d 401 (7th Cir. 2004), which references In re Sarrio, S.A. for a point irrelevant to U.S. 
law firms attempting to not comply with U.S. discovery requests because documents are 
undiscoverable in the hands of its foreign client. 
127 Ratliff v. Davis Polk & Wardell, 354 F.3d 165, 170 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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for recognizing attorney-client privilege” when documents are 
undiscoverable in the hands of a law firm’s foreign client and only in the 
U.S. for the purposes of legal review.
128
 The Court further noted that in 
Fisher the Supreme Court reasoned that:  
[t]he purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to 
make full disclosure to their attorneys. If discovery of 
documents could be obtained more easily from attorneys 
than from their clients, clients would hesitate to show 
their documents to their attorneys and it would be 
difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice. 
Accordingly, where documents unobtainable by 
subpoena while in the possession of the client are 
transferred to a lawyer to obtain legal advice, making the 
documents available to the process would defeat the 
purposes of the attorney-client privilege.
129
 
 The Court went on to articulate how Fisher was applicable, 
stating “[Fisher’s] reasoning would seem to apply where the documents 
are not amenable to subpoena duces tecum because they lie outside the 
statutory limits of the court’s power to compel production,” and 
highlighting that the attorney-client privilege would be “jeopardized if 
documents unreachable in a foreign country became discoverable 
because the person holding the documents sent them to a lawyer in the 
United States for advice.”130 Ultimately, however, these assertions would 
only amount to dicta because the law firm’s client waived its right to 
privilege with respect to documents sent to the U.S. for legal review.
131
 It 
nevertheless remains clear that if a firm presents a strategically chosen 
set of facts in the Second Circuit, the Court would almost certainly hold 
that a firm would not have to produce documents that are undiscoverable 
in the hands of the law firm’s foreign client.132 In fact, the Court has gone 
on to comment on this newly created privilege in addition to expressing 
when it may be waived in the context of securities litigation.
133
  
 In addition to creating a new attorney-client privilege for foreign 
clients, the Second Circuit has also indicated when such a right will be 
considered waived.
134
 In Ratliff v. Davis Polk & Wardwell, 354 F.3d 165 
(2d Cir. 2003), the Court revisited the attorney-client privilege created by 
In re Sarrio, noting that “exposing documents—not otherwise subject to 
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production—to discovery demands after delivery to one’s attorney whose 
office was located within the sweep of a subpoena would produce a 
curious and unacceptable result. [It] would not only chill open and frank 
communications between attorneys and their clients, it would 
disenfranchise local counsel from representing foreign entities”135 
(emphasis added). The Court went on to warn law firms to be careful 
about discovery arrangements between their clients and government 
agencies, expressing such arrangements could destroy attorney-client 
privilege.
136
 The Court explained that where a law firm agrees with the 
SEC to provide any documents it reviews to the SEC, the In re Sarrio 
attorney-client privilege is waived and the SEC can subpoena any 
documents held by the U.S. firm.
137
 This principle, the Court noted, will 
also destroy attorney-client privilege where the law firm agrees to 
provide documents to any third party that would not be required to 
comply with the attorney-client privilege.
138
 Therefore, U.S. law firms 
have to be careful about how they word arrangements with the SEC with 
respect to whether the agency is authorized to obtain internal 
investigation documents.
139
 If a U.S. firm creates an agreement with the 
SEC that states its client is only willing to produce documents that are 
not privileged, they can base their operations in the Second Circuit’s 
jurisdiction and potentially protect harmful documents from coming 
within the SEC’s reach. Otherwise, the potential protection that the 
Second Circuit provides law firms and their international clients could be 
unnecessarily waived.   
VII. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, In re Sarrio has the potential to dramatically change 
the way law firms perform internal investigations in a variety of legal 
contexts. In addition to being one of the few ways U.S. law firms can 
compete with foreign law firms outside the SEC’s subpoena jurisdiction, 
it allows firms headquartered under the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction to 
have an unusual comparative advantage against U.S. firms outside the 
Circuit’s jurisdictional purview. This may result in other circuits 
adopting the Second Circuit’s viewpoint, affording U.S. law firms 
outside the Second Circuit the ability to assert a new attorney-client 
                                                 
135 Id. at 169. 
136 Id. at 170. 
137 “Even if we assume that, when the documents were sent by E & Y to Davis Polk to secure the 
firm’s legal advice, they were entitled to protection, such protection was lost when E & Y 
voluntarily authorized David Polk to send the documents to the SEC. E & Y might be entitled to 
protection if it sends documents to its law firm to obtain legal advice. But any such protection does 
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privilege. Until that point is reached, by successfully testing the dictum 
of In re Sarrio, firms in the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction will not only be 
able to compete with international law firms, but also be better able to 
attract foreign clients over their domestic competitors. Thus, the new 
application of In re Sarrio has the potential to fundamentally alter the 
landscape of many legal practice groups. 
